This is the third in my series on the social costs of drug prohibition.you can Read part 1 here (prison-industrial complex) and part 2 (Militarization of the police) here.
In the 1914 decision America vs Regan, the Supreme Court held that “rules of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt generally apply strictly only to criminal proceedings.” This decision is important because it subsequently allowed civil litigation. in rem taken against someone who has not been criminally charged (against something such as property) in parsorum. (to people). Specifically, Section 881 of President Nixon’s Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 provides that all controlled substances and equipment used in the manufacture and distribution of such substances are subject to forfeiture. declared (Stahl, 1992). Section 881, the practice of civil asset forfeiture, created the extrajudicial seizure of assets suspected of being used (or profited from).
Section 881(a)(6) was added in 1978 to allow the seizure of proceeds from drug trafficking and anything purchased with the proceeds, but section 881(a)(7) in 1984 ), allowing the confiscation of anything. Real property used to violate drug laws. This is because the law enforcement agency responsible for seizing the property is allowed to keep the property, or the proceeds from its sale. Asset forfeiture has become an important source of revenue for these government agencies. This created a situation in which the conflict between true enforcement of the ban and increased revenue was too often decided in favor of the latter (Boudreaux & Pritchard, 1996). This is possible because the standards for criminal and civil proceedings are different. While criminal suspects must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is sufficient for victims of asset forfeiture to have a “reasonable suspicion” that they committed the crime.
Of course, reasonable doubt is a highly subjective standard of proof, and current law provides little objectivity. This is not surprising since asset forfeiture sits at the intersection of criminal and civil law. In response to the case in question, the court declared: in rem In some cases it is forfeited criminally and in other cases it is forfeited civilly. In fact, this blurred distinction serves a purpose: it allows law enforcement to civilly punish individuals suspected of criminal activity without increasing the burden of proof required for criminal prosecution. Individuals whose property is seized are then required to prove their innocence after the fact, an often expensive process that clearly violates due process protections. Unfortunately for these individuals, case law tends to view this protection as a matter of criminal rather than civil prosecution.
Police budgets are subject to the same scarcity laws as other budgets, and enforcement priorities always include: opportunity cost. For example, the money and human resources spent investigating a car theft cannot be used to investigate a murder. In fact, research shows that shifting resources to drug enforcement lowers the opportunity cost of property crime, leading to an increase in it (Benson, Rasmussen, & Solars, 1995). Forfeiture of assets allows the police department’s drug enforcement unit to supplement its income. There is little cost to taxpayers other than the cost of foreclosure. Additionally, individuals whose assets are seized are often permanently deprived of their assets, even if they have committed no crime.
The incentives to maintain this system go far beyond local departments. They keep most of the proceeds, but the funds are often spread around, especially in cash foreclosures. Although Williams (2002) observes that some departments share a small portion of their revenues with local schools, health departments, and favored nonprofit organizations, Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) points out that the courts also receive a portion of these funds, leaving little incentive for judicial independence. Protecting the property rights of victims of confiscation. All of this contributes to a paradigm in which garnishments are used in place of convictions in violation of the law. Fourth AmendmentThe exclusionary rules regarding evidence shifted the focus of law enforcement in the drug field from fighting crime to tracking assets (Jensen & Gerber, 1996). As we discuss next, not only did this change in focus not reduce crime, there is also evidence that it contributed to an increase in crime.
Turnell Brown is an economist and public policy analyst based in Atlanta.
