There are many arguments about what makes a state legitimate, or what gives it the authority that creates the obligation of obedience. There is one argument that I have always found unconvincing, and as I was thinking about it recently, I realized why it has always seemed inadequate in my mind.
The arguments I have in mind can be found in the work of thinkers such as Thomas Christiano. Rule by the Majority: A Fundamental Problem in Democratic TheoryCristiano argues that democracy gives government authority because it has an obligation to treat members of society as equals and show them proper respect. In Cristiano’s view, if a law is passed democratically with the support of the majority, then to disobey that law is to put one’s own judgment above that of other citizens. This would mean treating other citizens as inferior, which is wrong. Therefore, we have an obligation to obey democratically passed laws.
There are several reasons to be skeptical of this argument: why should we believe that we have a moral obligation to follow the judgment of others if their judgment happens to be more popular than our own? And further, why would we need this obligation? Enforceable Is an obligation an obligation that can be enforced by coercion? Going back a few decades, a majority of Americans opposed interracial marriage. And yet some people married across races. They clearly believed (correctly!) that their judgment on the matter was better than that of the majority of other citizens. It seems clearly false to say that in so doing they did something wrong, much less made an unforgivable mistake that would justify coercion.
But there is a more fundamental reason why I find this idea unconvincing: it misses an idea that is much more prominent in the classical liberal and libertarian tradition: the idea of reciprocity.
I think libertarians’ emphasis on interconnectedness is why they cite a disproportionate number of works. Ronald CoaseCoase’s work is not a unique contribution to libertarian policy. You can’t start with Coase’s theorem and go straight to anarcho-capitalism. But Coase does suggest that economists should: Externalities In the wrong way. Previous economic analysis had treated externalities as one-way costs. But Coase pointed out that externalities are reciprocal, that is, the burden is two-way between the parties. (This conclusion was also independently reached by a fictional physicist.) Sheldon Cooper!) For this reason, attempts to correct externalities by saying “we should impose a tax on the party that creates the externality” don’t work.
Cristiano’s argument suffers from this same lack of reciprocity. Even if we assume that it is an impermissible error to prioritize one’s judgment over the judgment of others, the situation is still reciprocal. If my compatriots say that I must submit to their decision because if I do not, I am treating them unfairly, regarding my judgment as superior to theirs, then I can equally say that by trying to force me to submit to their decision, they are prioritizing their judgment over mine, regarding me as inferior, and treating me unfairly. The situation is reciprocal. And by treating the “error” of prioritizing one’s judgment over the judgment of others in this non-reciprocal way, Cristiano’s theory is merely treating people equally in the doublet that “some animals are more equal than others.”
I used to Claimed Yoram Hazony’s concern that an unwavering commitment to free trade could undermine the bonds of mutual loyalty on which nations depend suffers from the same flaw: I gave a hypothetical example of a man faced with the choice between buying cheap lumber from Carl, a Canadian, or buying the same lumber at a higher price from Walter, an American.
Perhaps Hazony feels obligated by loyalty to buy from Walter rather than from Carl, but it’s not clear why. After all, the only thing Hazony brings up often is Mutual loyalty Mutual loyalty is CommonObligations go both ways. So why doesn’t buying from Carl fail to show Walter an appropriate level of loyalty? Why doesn’t Walter fail to show me an appropriate level of loyalty by insisting that I buy from him, even though it means a huge additional financial burden for me? Simply saying “mutual loyalty” doesn’t solve the problem.
One of the finest recent works in liberal political philosophy (in my no-nonsense opinion). Minimal governance Dan Moller’s book makes a similar point about reciprocating the injustice of certain acts.
I believe, perhaps contrary to other classical liberal ideas, that the core impulse is givewhich is to say that the first thing that is puzzling is the suggestion that we have rights. requestThe impulse moves along the connection table. I I couldn’t make such a request. If you think about it, it’s absurd. you To make such a demand of them is They are You shouldn’t make such demands on us.
Mueller argues that “if we accept even modest restrictions on treating others badly in order to improve our own lot,” and if those restrictions are applied reciprocally and equally among citizens, “we quickly slip into a kind of libertarianism.”
Of course, these are not the only theories of political power, but I find it surprising that so many theories of political power that are based on mutual loyalty and proper respect for the judgments of others do not presuppose, or must ignore, the problems of reciprocity that these principles seem to entail.
