Most people, and even some serious analysts, seem to assume that the notion of “national interest” or “interests of the United States” has a clearly identifiable meaning (“the United States” can be substituted for the name of any country). This notion is central to “realist” discussion of foreign policy, and political scientist William Lugar, for example, has written:Ideal or curiosity?” in Law and Freedom (July 26, 2024). Dr. Luger argues that in matters of foreign policy and war and peace, the national interest is a practical guide, not a philosophical ideal.
The meaning of “national interest” may seem obvious: it is the public interest where the people are the people; it is the interest of all the people. Where these interests do not exactly coincide, the national interest is taken to be in some way the sum of them. This concept is similar to the interests of two individual partners in a corporation or association: the sum of their respective interests, such as making a profit or (for example) promoting some charitable purpose. If the national interest is not a simple sum, addition and subtraction, of all the individual interests, it consists of some other form of aggregation.
If we think about it carefully, the problem quickly becomes clear: how is it possible to add, subtract, or aggregate, even conceptually, the interests of two different individuals? In a private cooperative venture, the partners pursue a common interest. In fact, this is why they cooperate. In tribes or “organizations” (In the Hakekian sense), society is the framework within which private individuals and organizations operate. Since each individual (or voluntary partnership) has its own interests, it is problematic and confusing to speak of social interest, public interest, or national interest.
Suppose a rural Appalachian has a “3 interest” in national security and an international New Yorker has a “2 interest.” Or vice versa. If these are the only two people in the country, is the national interest 2+3=5? Multiply this problem by a country of 300 million people. And, of course, it’s Nationwide If the interests of each member of the state are not taken into equal consideration, the benefits are lost.
There are many theories about the impossibility of aggregating the interests of multiple individuals. Let us define an individual’s interest as that individual’s utility, i.e., how highly he or she rates their state on the measure of their subjective preferences. Economists have known for over a century that an outside observer cannot simply add or subtract subjective preferences that are known or experienced only by the individual’s owner. If some individual utility falls while others rise, we cannot say that “social utility” rises. Any observer or philosopher can tell us that A la PlaAnyone who claims to be able to do this balancing is merely expressing personal opinion and personal power. Mainstream welfare economists have proven this (see, for example, Francis M. Butthole’s “A Simple Analysis of Welfare Maximization”). American Economic Review (1957)).
Democratic majorities do not solve problems. They cannot determine what the interests of the people are, even under the sophisticated form that welfare economists call the “social welfare function.” Moreover, minority individuals are also part of the state. Given that different voting systems can lead to different election outcomes, it is difficult to know who the majority is in the first place (Gordon Tullock, Government Failure: A Primer on Public Choice))?
The difficulty of aggregating preferences through voting, discovered in the 18th century by Nicolas de Condorcet and in the 19th century by mathematician Charles Dodgson (aka Lewis Carroll), was recognized and formalized by economists in the mid-20th century. Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem mathematically proved that under realistic conditions, there is no voting procedure that reproduces voter rationality (in particular the transitivity or consistency of preferences) and is not dictatorial (see Arrow’s 1951 book). Social Choice and Individual ValuesArrow won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972 for his work in this area and became a pioneer of the “social choice” school of thought.
In a book published in 1982 Liberalism vs. PopulismPolitical scientist William Liker brought these findings and their meaning to the attention of political scientists: With respect to our question here, majority rule cannot express the interests of the state in a logically consistent and non-dictatorial way (where “non-dictatorial” refers to a situation in which a dictator or group of dictators cannot override the preferences of other individuals).
This conclusion seems to lead us to an impasse. If the public interest does not exist, what are the standards of public policy? If the national interest does not exist, what are the standards that determine how states deal with other states or how they compel their citizens to act, for example by regulating trade or other voluntary relations with individuals in other states?
There are not many ways out of this impasse. Two ways are represented by two of the great economists and political philosophers of our time: one is to deny that the state has any economic or moral legitimacy and to see it as merely an instrument through which political rulers and their clients impose their choices on the rest of society and the state. Anthony de Jasayself classical liberals and anarchistsHe used this exit to defend the ideal of a stateless society in which there would be no public policy whatsoever, but he expressed some doubts about the ability of such a society to resist aggression by nation-states or other international armed groups.
Another way out is Formulated by Nobel laureate economist James Buchanan He and his colleagues argue that if there is no social organization with its own utility and its own interests, then the only legitimacy and function of the state is to uphold a set of rules that represent the interests of society. General It is the interest of all members of society. This common denominator is necessarily thin, since it represents the preferences and values of the members of society. all Rules that the members of a society (such as a nation) unanimously agree upon. At this level of abstraction, it is easy to add value to the preferences in an individual’s utility function. Rules that all individuals agree upon have the sole purpose of maintaining a free society in which every individual has equal freedom to pursue his or her own interests, i.e., his or her own happiness.
This novel approach is more revolutionary than it may seem. Like the rule of law itself, it is rather abstract. Coherent abstractions are better than incoherent and unrealistic prescriptions like “national interest.” In my view, foreign policy “realists” are rather unrealistic. General The national interest provides very different guidance when it comes to issues of foreign policy and defense, such as conscription, denying freedom to protect it, or intimidating individuals in the name of the “national interest.”
One might argue that the phrase “national interest” is merely a shortcut to express the common interest shared by all individuals, but it is a dangerous shortcut to personifying “the nation.” CollectiveHistory and theory strongly suggest that “national interests” create an imaginary “we” that overwhelms real interests. IndividualThe “common interest” is exactly what it sounds like: General Preferences (including ideals) James Buchanan’s Common Minimum— of all individual members of a free society. Of course, this assumes that the individuals live in a free society, or at least one that is becoming one.
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The philosopher king represents his people and their interests.
