Now I invite you, EconLog readers, to challenge my thinking.
First, I want to start by clearing my throat that we all know how hard it is to change someone’s mind. It’s often very difficult to change minds, and people are reluctant to change their minds. And we all have a tendency to think we’re more open-minded than we actually are. That being said, I do I think I’m better than most people at changing my mind, even on very fundamental issues that have a huge impact on my life. Let me give you two examples: For a large part of my life I was a very devout and faithful Christian. But now I’m an atheist because I’ve come across various compelling arguments that have changed my mind on the subject. (This makes me a bit skeptical of people who say things like “it’s pointless to debate religion, nobody will change their mind” because, I (I certainly did, and I know many people who do for the same reasons.) Secondly, I used to eat a meat-based diet, so I was much closer to the people who follow so-called “carnivore diets” today. Michael Huemer and Bryan Caplan debate I became embroiled in the debate over ethical vegetarianism and stopped eating meat that very day, because I found Huemer’s arguments much stronger and more persuasive than Caplan’s. I felt no hesitation in abandoning my lifelong religious beliefs and making radical changes to my diet and lifestyle just because I came across a compelling argument that went against my views at the time.
So here are some things I believe to be true, some that I think are controversial enough that many readers will disagree. I’m not asking you to adjudicate the issue here in the comments section; there’s only so much a blog post or comment section can do. Instead, if you disagree with my views, What do you offer as the best, strongest, and most persuasive explanation for your objection? – Are there any arguments you personally agree with? Depending on what arrives, I may pick one out, read it, and compile my reactions into one of my detailed reviews across multiple posts.
Now that we’re all set, here are some ideas I have in mind.
- Moral realism – the idea that there are objective moral facts about right and wrong, regardless of what anyone thinks. That is, if Nazi Germany had won World War II and conquered the whole world, and subsequent generations had been raised to believe that the Holocaust was a great good, the Holocaust would still have been wrong. This is not necessarily an unpopular view of mine (moral realism is majority Ultimately, philosophers are divided, but there remains enough disagreement to make it worth considering. If you lean toward moral anti-realism, which books, articles, or essays do you find most persuasive?
- There is nothing morally special about states. This does not mean that state actions are never justified. What I am saying is that what justifies state coercion does not justify individual coercion as well. If circumstances do not justify individual coercion, then state coercion is also not justified. Again, this does not mean that justified state actions are the empty set, because justified individual coercion is not the empty set either. But the two sets are equivalent, at least it seems to me. Moreover, I deny that Jason Brennan is arguing that Calls The argument is to replace the “special immunity theory” with the “moral equality theory,” which holds that state actions should be evaluated by the same moral standards as other individuals and organizations, and can be legitimately resisted by the same standards. If you disagree and think that the legitimacy of coercion is not a situation that creates justification, but rather Who If you are engaging in coercive acts, what do you think is the most powerful argument in support of this? Or, if you believe that state agents enjoy a special moral immunity that will not be resisted if they act unjustly, what do you think is the most powerful argument in support of this?
- Equality of outcomes has no intrinsic value. There may be an instrumental benefit to equality of outcomes, but that benefit is instrumental. Of course, just because something is “merely” instrumentally beneficial doesn’t mean that it’s unimportant. But equality of outcomes has no value in itself. Imagine one world in which there is vast, devastating, equal poverty, and another world in which no one suffers poverty, but in which some people are more well off than others. Someone who believes in the intrinsic value of equality of outcomes could still accept that the second world is better. whole – They may acknowledge that the instrumental value of eliminating poverty is greater than the intrinsic value of equal outcomes. But they still at least Some sense The first world is not better for me, even if the second world is better overall. Equality of misery and suffering produces no good that is offset by that equality. But if you think there is real intrinsic value in equal outcomes, what is the best argument you can show me?
- There is no coherent notion of aggregated decisions or preferences. That is, phrases like “we, as a society, have decided that” are at best misleading shorthand and at worst fundamentally contradictory. There is no meaningful way to aggregate individual decisions into an overall social decision, or to average individual preferences into a meaningful social preference. But you probably disagree and believe that there is a very meaningful notion of social preference. If so, tell me who develops the most persuasive argument for that case, and where I can find that argument.
I’ll stick with these four for now, but if this proves fruitful I may try this approach again. Commenters, please comment!